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Abstract— Human agents are increasingly serving as data
sources in the context of dynamical systems. Unlike traditional
sensors, humans may manipulate or omit data for selfish
reasons. Therefore, this paper studies the influence of effort-
averse strategic sensors on discrete-time LTI systems. In our
setting, sensors exert costly effort to collect data, and report
their effort to the system operator. However, sensors do not
directly benefit from the output of the system, so they will not
exert much effort to ensure accuracy and may even falsify their
reported effort to maximize their utility. We explore payment
mechanisms that incentivize truthful reporting from strategic
sensors. We demonstrate the influence of the true and reported
effort on the expected operational cost. Then, we use the
realizations of the system cost to construct a payment function.
We show that payment functions typically used in static settings
will not be able to elicit truthful reports in general, and present
a modified payment function that elicits truthful reporting,
which requires terms that compensate for the dynamic impact
of reported efforts on the closed-loop performance of the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Human agents are increasingly serving as data sources in
the context of dynamical systems. However, unlike conven-
tional sensors, human agents can manipulate or even falsify
data to achiever their personal goals. The strategic behavior
of data sources can have a significant impact on the control
and operation of the system.
For example, navigation apps like Google Maps and Waze
combine data from real-world sensors and user data to
estimate the traffic flow and congestion on road networks.
However, when interacting with these apps, users are more
interested in minimizing their own travel times rather than the
overall traffic flows, so they may not put effort in reporting
their data, or even falsify their data to achieve their personal
goals. Such behavior can lead to worse traffic conditions. In
this paper, we explore the design of incentives that help align
the goals of strategic data sources and system operators.
In reality, data sources often incur an effort cost when
obtaining high quality data. In this paper, we model our
strategic sensors as effort-averse, i.e. all else equal, they
will prefer to exert less effort and share lower quality
data. Furthermore, system operators do not have access to
data sources’ private information. In particular, the system
operators do not know the effort exerted by the data sources,
nor the exact distribution from which their data is drawn.
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We explore how incentives can compensate for the problem
of moral hazard that arises due to this asymmetric informa-
tion [1].
The contribution of this paper is to study the influence of a
single strategic sensor on the operational cost of a dynamical
system. We decompose the operational cost into terms that
depend on reported information and terms that depend on the
hidden effort level. Given this decomposition, we show that
payment mechanisms designed for static situations do not
incentivize truthful reporting in our setting, and we provide
a modified payment method that ensures truthful reporting
for parameters that satisfy certain conditions.
In particular, we consider a discrete-time, linear, time-
invariant system minimizing a quadratic cost on a finite time
horizon. In our setting, strategic sensors report an effort level
ê and exert an effort e, which may not necessarily equal ê. We
demonstrate the influence of ê and e on the system cost and
investigate payment methods that enforce truthful reporting,
i.e. ensures that it is in the strategic sensor’s best interest to
choose ê = e.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows the related literature and contextualizes our work.
We present our model and formally outline the interaction
between the operator and strategic sensor in Section III.
We define the control policy in Section IV. In Section V,
we analyze the system cost and expected system cost as a
function of the true effort e and reported effort ê, providing
a decomposition of the expected system cost E[J ] into terms
that only depend on e and ê. We use this decomposition to
construct payment functions in Section VI. Finally, we close
with final remarks and present some avenues for future work
in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Strategic data sources and the corresponding incentive
mechanism design problem have received great attention
in recent years. Most of literature on them fall into two
categories, based on whether the application domain is static
or dynamic.
Some of the existing work studies how to incentivize
strategic data sources in a static setting, where there is no
underlying dynamical system, and the data collectors are
typically trying to estimate some underlying fixed function.
In [2], an optimal contract is presented that minimizes the
total payment of the estimator while guaranteeing strategic
sensors to put in sufficient effort and truthfully report the
estimate, by assuming one of the sensors is loyal, i.e.
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reporting true information. [3] designs an optimal mech-
anism that minimizes the expected total compensation to
the strategic sources while guaranteeing certain level of
estimation accuracy. [4] models a data market with multiple
data aggregators and multiple data sources, and shows that
such coupling would lead to either infinite many equilibria
or none, where all equilibria can be socially inefficient. [5]
proposes an optimal mechanism of statistical estimators that
minimizes the weighted sum of payments and estimation
error, and shows that this mechanism is extremely robust, i.e,
each data source’s decision is a unique dominant strategy. [6]
studies the estimation problem in a repeated setting and
designs a compensation scheme that employs stochastic data
verification and builds a reputation history for each sensor.
More recently, some literature has explored the impact
of strategic sensors and payment design in the context of
stochastic dynamical systems. [7] studies strategic stealthy
false-data injection attacks problem on discrete time linear
systems. The author provides the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the sensitivity metric to be unbounded, and
further proposed a novel attack policy in [8]. [9] designs
a mechanism for dynamical systems that ensures optimal
control, and truthfully reporting forms a Nash equilibrium
among the strategic agents. [10] introduces an extension
of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism that guarantees
Incentive Compatibility and truthful reporting of strategic
agents in a linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) dynamical sys-
tems. By carefully constructing a sequence of layered VCG
payments, such mechanism can also ensure that the mech-
anism is budget-balanced and satisfies individual rationality
under certain conditions.
Most of this previous work assumes some sort of adversar-
ial intent or some stake in the system operation; in contrast,
our work focuses primarily on an effort-averse data source.
Additionally, most of these works require multiple agents
to enforce truthfulness amongst each other; in contrast, we
consider the case of a single strategic sensor, and use the
dynamics of the system itself to enforce truthfulness.
The terms and setting in this paper are closely related
to [4]. Our contribution is to introduce the effort-averse
behavior of strategic data sources in a dynamic setting. In
our problem, strategic sensors can exert a costly effort e
to reduce their measurement noise. Because e is a private
information to strategic sensors, we allow sensors to report
their effort level as ê before they exert e. That is, the system
uses the control law designed with ê and incurs the true
measurement noise with e. However, strategic sensors do
not directly benefit from the system performance, and they
can even falsity ê to maximize their profit. Therefore, an
appropriate payment method is desired to ensure truthfully
reporting from sensors.
Given that the strategic sensors truthfully report, the
problem reduces to a classical control problem: minimizing
the expected quadratic cost of an LQG system. To our best
of our knowledge, this is one of the first papers studying
the impact of effort-averse strategic sensors on the system
costs in the LQG setting. The reported noise covariances
are used to design our controllers, and we separate out the
influence of the true noise covariance and the reported noise
covariances on the closed-loop performance of our system.
Using information available to a system operator, we design
payments that incentivize truthful reporting of the noise
covariances.
III. MODEL
In this section, we present our model. We look at a finite
time horizon control problem for a linear, time-invariant
(LTI) system in discrete time. At a high level, a system
operator wishes to calculate a sequence of control inputs
(uk)k which minimizes their operational cost. Doing so,
they have access to readings from two types of sensors.
The regular sensor provides measurements with a known
covariance (yrk)k. The strategic sensor exerts some level of
effort e to provide measurements (ysk)k; the level of effort e
affects the covariance of the measurements, but neither are
known by the system operator. The system operator must
issue incentives to the strategic sensor to ensure that the
operating costs are low. The overall flow of information and
control is summarized in Figure 1. For convenience, we’ve
also compiled all the named variables in Table I.
Fig. 1. Information and control flows in our model.
The system dynamics are given by:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk
yk =
[
yrk
ysk
]
= Cxk + vk =
[
Cr
Cs
]
xk +
[
vrk
vsk
]
(1)
Here, wk, vrk, and v
s
k are the process noise, and measurement
noise for the regular and strategic sensors, respectively.
We assume that all noise processes are independent, zero-
mean Gaussians. Additionally, the covariance of the strategic
sensor’s measurements depend on a hidden level of effort e.
x0 ∼ N (0,Σx0) wk ∼ N (0,Σw)
vk =
[
vrk
vsk
]
∼ N (0,Σv(e)), Σv(e) =
[
Σvr 0
0 Σvs(e)
]
For simplicity, in this paper, we assume the following form
for the strategic sensor’s covariance:
Σvs(e) = σ
2(e)I (2)
Notation Meaning Defined or First Used in Equation
A,B,C,Cr, Cs System dynamics (1)
wk, vk, v
r
k, v
s
k Process noise and observation noise (1)
σ2(e) The effort-to-variance mapping (2)
u(p, e) The strategic sensor’s utility function (3)
N The time horizon of optimization (4)
J,Q,R The system operator’s cost function and cost function parameters (4)
x¯, A¯, B¯ Augmented, closed-loop state variables and dynamics (6)
A¯, B¯, V¯ Iterated matrix applications (8)
Q¯k Quadratic cost for the augmented system (9)
Σ¯k(e), Σ¯k,1, Σ¯k,2 Covariance terms for the augmented noise (10)
Σ1,Σ2 Initial augmented covariance terms (12)
f1(ê), f2(ê) The decomposition of E[J(e, ê)] (14)
J∗(e) The expected cost under truthful reporting (15)
TABLE I
NOTATION REFERENCE CHART
Here, σ2(·) is the mapping from effort e to variance σ2(e).
Throughout this paper, we will assume that σ2(·) is strictly
decreasing, convex, and twice continuously differentiable.
Thus, as the level of effort increases, the variance decreases,
and effort has diminishing returns. And σ2(·) is a common
knowledge for sensors and the system operator.
The system operator announces a (potentially random)
payment function p to the strategic sensor. In Section VI,
we will provide a more detailed description of the payment
function and which information it depends on. In particular,
it is important that the payment p depend on the effort level
e, but the system operator does not have direct access to e.
Given this payment function p, the strategic sensor chooses
e to optimize its utility u that is defined as:
u(p, e) = E[p]− e (3)
Equation (3) implies that the strategic sensor is effort-averse:
all else equal, they would prefer to choose a smaller value
of e. Additionally, it assumes that the strategic sensor must
choose an effort level e prior to the realization of the payment
values and commit to it, i.e. that they must behave ex-ante.
Furthermore, the strategic sensor is risk-neutral regarding
these payments.
The system operator’s random cost function is:
J =
N−1∑
k=0
(
xTkQxk + u
T
kRuk
)
+ xTNQxN (4)
Here, Q  0 and R  0 are given positive definite matrices.
However, the system operator does not have access to e,
which is a private information for strategic sensors. There-
fore, we allow strategic sensors to report their effort level
ê before they exert e. That is, the system operator uses ê
to design LQR and Kalman filter and run the system where
the actual measurement with noise is determined by e. Now,
we present the order of play in this interaction, and outline
which information is available to agents when they make
decisions.
1) The system operator announces the payment function
p. The system operator knows the function σ2(·), but
not the effort e nor the variance σ2(e).
2) The strategic sensor reports an effort level ê, and exerts
an effort level e.
3) At each time k, the strategic sensor shares measure-
ment ysk with covariance Σvs(e), and the system oper-
ator makes a control decision uk. The control decision
can depend on ysk and ê, but not Σvs(e) or e. This
repeats for k = 0, . . . , N .
4) The system operator issues the promised payment to
the strategic sensor.
Ideally, if the strategic sensor is truthful, i.e ê = e, then we
can minimize the expectation of system cost E[J ] by choices
of inputs (uk)k with corresponding controller and observer.
However, strategic sensors can falsify their ê to maximize
their utilities. Therefore, how would E[J ] will be affected if
the control policy is designed with the information that is far
from the truth, i.e ê is far from e? And can we construct a
payments p to ensure that strategic sensors truthfully report
the effort they exert? This leads us to our problem statement.
Problem Statement. Given the system operator’s available
information, can they design a payment function p that
incentivizes truthful reporting (i.e. the strategic sensor is
incentivized to report ê = e)?
As a first step, we assume the system operator merely
wishes to minimize E[J ], and can offer any p without
incurring any additional cost. Although an unreasonable
assumption in practice, we believe the insights of this paper
provide an interesting first step. Even under this assumption,
the crux of the problem still remains: how can the system op-
erator, given his limited information, incentivize the strategic
data source appropriately?
For example, setting p that depends only on ê will not
incentivize the strategic sensor to exert effort. Instead, it will
make strategic sensor report a much higher ê to maximize
their utility without increasing their true effort e at all.
IV. CONTROLLER AND OBSERVER DESIGN UNDER
TRUTHFUL REPORTING
In this section, we outline how the system operator control
inputs. We design a controller and observer assuming that the
strategic sensor truthfully reports (i.e. that ê = e). Then, in
later sections, we will focus on designing payment contracts
p that induce truthful reporting.
First, supposing that the true measurement covariance is
Σv(ê), we can invoke the separation principle to minimize
E[J ]. That is, we can minimize our cost by estimating the
state with a Kalman filter, and push that state estimate
through a gain set by a linear-quadratic-regulator (LQR). Let
Lk(ê) denote the Kalman filter gain, Kk(ê) denote the LQR
feedback gain, and Pk denote the LQR cost-to-go matrix.
(See [11] for more details.) Thus, the feedback control policy
is:
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +Buk + Lk+1 (yk+1 − C (Axˆk +Buk))
uk = Kkxˆk
(5)
Let xˆk denote the state estimate at time k, and let Σk and
Σk+1|k denote the intermediate covariance estimates in the
Kalman filter calculations.
Thus, given a reported effort level ê, this defines a control
policy given by the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) con-
troller defined in Equation (5). This allows us to think of
the system operator’s random cost J as a function of two
arguments: J(e, ê).
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COST J(e, ê)
In this section, we outline properties of J(e, ê) and its
expectation E[J(e, ê)]. Whereas the underlying true level of
effort e is unknown, the system operator can observe their
operational cost J(e, ê). Thus, if the system operator wishes
to design payments that incentivize truthful reporting ê = e,
we need to explore how this observable quantity J(e, ê) is
affected by the decisions of the strategic sensor.
First, let’s provide an overview of how e and ê influence
our system. The LQR gain Kk does not depend on ê at all.
The estimation gain Lk(ê) depends on ê but not e. Neither
the observer or controller gains are affected by e, since the
system operator does not know e. However, the realized
values of the noise y depend on e, so the resulting state
estimate xˆ depends on e and ê. Consequently, u = Kkxˆ
depends on both terms, and so does J .
The key insight of this section is that J admits a decompo-
sition into terms that depend on e and terms that depend on
ê. This is given in Equation (13). This allows us to design the
payments in Section VI in a fashion that incentivizes truthful
reporting.
A. A decomposition of E[J(e, ê)]
We can decompose the expected cost to separate its
dependence on e and ê.
Looking at the closed-loop system, with observer and con-
troller gains parameterized by ê, let us define the augmented
state and dynamics x¯, A¯(ê), B¯(ê), and v¯:[
xk+1
xˆk+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x¯k+1
=
[
A BKk
Lk+1(ê)CA A+BKk − Lk+1(ê)CA
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯k(ê)
[
xk
xˆk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x¯k
(6)
+
[
I 0
Lk+1(ê)C Lk+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B¯k(ê)
[
wk
vk+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v¯k(e)
Σv¯(e) =
[
Σw 0
0 Σv(e)
]
=
Σw 0 00 Σvr 0
0 0 σ2(e)I
 (7)
Furthermore, note that we can recursively apply Equation (6)
to yield:
x¯k+1 = A¯k(ê)x¯k + B¯k(ê)v¯k
= A¯k · · · A¯1A¯0︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯k(ê)
x¯0 +

(A¯k · · · A¯1B¯0)T
(A¯k · · · A¯2B¯1)T
...
(B¯k)
T

T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B¯k(ê)

v¯0
v¯1
...
v¯k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
V¯k(e)
(8)
Finally, let’s separate out the appropriate cost terms by their
dependence on e and ê. Let’s define the following:
Q¯k =
[
Q 0
0 KTk RKk
]
(9)
Σ¯k(e) = E[V¯kV¯ᵀk] =
Σv¯(e) . . .
Σv¯(e)
 (10)
From Equation (7), we can extract the σ2(e) from Σ¯k(e)
and define constant matrices Σ¯k,1 and Σ¯k,2 such that:
Σ¯k(e) = Σ¯k,1 + σ
2(e)Σ¯k,2 (11)
Similarly, let’s look at the initial covariance of our aug-
mented state:
E(x¯0x¯T0 )
=
 Σx0 Σx0CTLT0 (ê)
L0(ê)CΣx0 L0(ê)(CΣx0C
T +
[
Σvr 0
0 Σvs(e)
]
)LT0 (ê)

Accoording to (2), E(x¯0x¯T0 ) can be written as:
E(x¯0x¯T0 ) = Σ1(ê) + σ2(e)Σ2(ê) (12)
Therefore, noting that KN = 0 and the independence of
noise across time, we can rewrite J(e, ê) as:
E[J(e, ê)] = E
[
N∑
k=0
x¯T Q¯kx¯
]
=
N∑
k=1
(
tr
(
Q¯k(A¯k−1(ê)E(x¯0x¯T0 )A¯Tk−1(ê)
+ B¯k−1(ê)Σ¯k(e)B¯Tk−1(ê)
))
+ tr(Q¯0E(x¯0x¯T0 ))
Along with Σ¯k(e) defined in (11), we can represent
E[J(e, ê)] in a concise form:
E[J(e, ê)] = f1(ê) + σ2(e)f2(ê) (13)
Where f1(ê) and f2(ê) are non-negative functions that are
sum of traces of multiplications of positive definite matrices:
fi(ê) = =
N∑
k=1
(
tr
(
Q¯k(A¯k−1(ê)Σi(ê)A¯Tk−1(ê)
+ B¯k−1(ê)Σ¯k,iB¯Tk−1(ê)
))
+ tr(Q¯0Σi(ê)) for i = 1, 2
(14)
B. Properties of E[J(e, ê)]
Given the decomposition in Equation (13), we can derive
properties of E[J(e, ê)].
First, we fix the reported effort ê and view this as a
function of the true effort e.
Proposition 1. For a fixed ê, e 7→ E[J(e, ê)] is convex and
strictly decreasing.
Proof. Noting the decomposition in Equation (13), for a
fixed ê, we can see that this mapping is the composition
of a convex function with an affine function. The fact that
this function is strictly decreasing follows from the fact σ2(·)
is strictly decreasing.
Next, we fix the true effort e and look at the reported
effort ê. Note that the LQG controller specified in Section IV
is optimal under truthful reporting, since, in this case, our
problem reduces to the classical LQG control problem.
Based on empirical evidence, we conjecture that it seems
that f1 is generally decreasing and convex whereas f2
is generally increasing and concave. (Varying the system
parameters yielded this result consistently.)
Consider the following 2-D example with time horizon
N = 300:
A =
[
0.7 0
0.7 0.7
]
B =
[
1
0
]
Cr =
[
1 0
]
Cs =
[
0 1
]
Σvs = 1 R = 1
Σx0 = Σw =
[
1 0
0 1
]
Q =
[
1 0
0 1
]
Σvh = σ
2(e) =
1
e
The plots of f1 and f2 for this system are shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. f1(ê) and f2(ê) as a function of ê for the 2-D example described
in Section V.
If this conjecture is true, the decomposition implies that
(e, ê) 7→ E[J(e, ê)] is neither convex nor concave, which is
shown in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If f1 is convex and f2 is concave (or
vice versa), then (e, ê) 7→ E[J(e, ê)] is neither convex nor
concave.
Proof. From Equation (13), E[J(e, ê)] will be dominated by
f2(ê) with small e, and will be dominated by f1(ê) for a
large e.
At a minimum, the 2-D example shows that the mapping
(e, ê) 7→ E[J(e, ê)] is not concave nor convex, and this
property will hold in general.
Additionally, let J∗ denote the expected cost under truthful
reporting:
J∗(ê) = E[J(ê, ê)] (15)
In this case, the problem reduces to a classical control
problem and we can see J∗(ê) decreases as ê increases.
Proposition 3. The optimal cost J∗(ê) decreases as ê
increases.
Proof. Note that:
J?(ê) =
N−1∑
k=0
Tr (QΣk(ê)) +QNΣN
+
N∑
k=0
TrPk
(
Σk|k−1(ê)− Σk(ê)
) (16)
From Equation (16), it suffices to show that
Σk(ê)  Σk(ê′) if ê′ > ê
For the state xk and history of observations y0, . . . , yk, these
random vectors are jointly Gaussian:
xk
y0
...
yk
 ∼ N (0,Σ) Σ =
[
Σxx Σxy
Σyx Σyy
]
Note that Σxy and Σyx do not depend on ê because the input
u is known and therefore E[xy] does not depends on ê. That
is, only Σyy depends on the measurement noise covariance,
and it can be written as a form of Σyy = M + σ2(ê)D,
where M is a positive definite matrix and D is a diagonal
matrix. Then the covariance of the conditional distribution
xk|y0, y1, . . . , yk is Σxx−ΣxyΣ−1yy Σyx. Therefore σ2(ê) >
σ2(ê′) implies J?(ê) > J?(ê′).
We plot the functions ê 7→ E[J(e, ê)] and J∗ in Figure 3.
We can see that for a fixed e, the shape of ê 7→ E[J(e, ê)]
changes with different values e. For small values of e,
the function looks concave for the range of domain values
plotted, and for larger values of e, the function looks convex.
Fig. 3. The functions ê 7→ E[J(e, ê)] and J∗(ê) as a function of ê, for
different values of e. (Note J∗(ê) does not depend on e.)
VI. EXPLORATION OF PAYMENT FUNCTIONS
The main goal of this work is to study how a system
operator can design payment functions p to incentivize a
strategic data source to truthfully report their effort ê = e.
In this section, we construct payment functions p which are
based on the information available to the system operator.
Note that J∗(e) is simply the expected cost of the classical
LQG controller, and this can be calculated a priori, according
to (15). Additionally, the system operator can observe J(e, ê)
based on the actual behavior of the underlying dynamical
system.
Let’s construct the payment function now.
First, let’s discuss truthful reporting. That is, for a fixed e,
we wish for the strategic sensor’s optimal ê to be ê = e.
Note that E[J(e, ê)] = J?(ê) when ê = e, and, by the
decomposition in Equation (13) and the properties of σ2(·),
E[J(e, ê)] 6= J?(ê) when ê 6= e. Thus, the payments should
penalize deviations between E[J(e, ê)] and J?(ê). Since we
only have access to a sample J(e, ê) rather than the expected
value E[J(e, ê)], a common way to do this is through a
quadratic penalty, which can decompose into a bias term
and a direct penalty on the quantity of interest.
(J(e, ê)− J?(ê))2 = (J(e, ê)− E[J(e, ê)])2
+(E[J(e, ê)]− J?(ê))2
However, payment with only quadratic penalty will make
sensors exert small effort, although they will truthfully report
it. Therefore, we would like the sensor to internalize the
operational cost: the lower the realized value J(e, ê), the
higher the payment should be. Thus, we define the payment:
p0(J
?(ê), J(e, ê)) = a− bJ(J(e, ê)− J?(ê))2 − beJ(e, ê)
(17)
Where a, bJ , and be are non-negative constants. The term
with bJ is to incentivize truthful reporting, and the term with
be is to incentivize sensors to choose a higher value of e. This
form of payment function has been commonly used in many
related literature, i.e. [2], [4], [5]. In our model, we assumed
the strategic sensor acts ex-ante and is risk-neutral, so we
can see the expected value of this payment is:
E [p0(J?(ê), J(e, ê))]
= a− bJE
[
(J(e, ê)− J?(ê))2]− beE [J(e, ê)]
= a− bJ
(
Var[J(e, ê)] + (σ2(e)− σ2(ê))2f22 (ê)
)
− be(f1(ê) + σ2(e)f2(ê))
However, the optimal point of the sensor’s utility,
E [p0(J
?(ê), J(e, ê))]−e, depends on the properties of f1(ê)
and f2(ê). As shown in Section V in Equation (14), we can
calculate f1 and f2 given the system parameters. However,
none of our previous results would imply that the sensor’s
expected utility would be minimized by ê = e. Furthermore,
the term Var[J(e, ê)] also depends on e and ê, and does
not disappear as other non-dynamic applications. Therefore,
we can not guarantee this payment incentivizes the strategic
sensor to truthfully report ê = e. This leads to our next
proposition.
Proposition 4. In general, the payment contract p0, given
in Equation (17), does not incentivize truthful reporting.
Proof. Follows from the previous discussion.
To resolve this problem, we wish to make sure that ê = e
is the optimal point, even as f1(ê), f2(ê) and Var[J(e, ê)]
change. Because f1(ê) and f2(ê) can be calculated ex-ante,
we modify the payment in Equation (17) by making the
coefficient bJ depend on ê, and also introducing the f2(ê)
term. Let bJ be any non-negative, convex, twice continuously
differentiable function. Then, we can define the new payment
p(J?(ê), J(e, ê)) as:
p(J?(ê), J(e, ê))
= a− bJ(ê)
(
J(e, ê)− J∗(ê)
f2(ê)
)2
− be
(
J(e, ê)− J∗(ê)
f2(ê)
+ σ2(ê)
) (18)
Taking the expectation of this payment function, and noting
our decomposition in Equation (13):
E [p(J?(ê), J(e, ê))]
= a− bJ(ê)E
(
(J(e, ê)− J?(ê)
f2(ê)
)2
− be
(
E[J(e, ê)]− J?(ê)
f2(ê)
+ σ2(ê)
)
= − bJ(ê)
f22 (ê)
Var[J(e, ê)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pvar
+p?(e, ê)
(19)
Where:
p?(e, ê) = a− bJ(ê)(σ2(e)− σ2(ê))2 − beσ2(e) (20)
By construction, the f1(ê) terms cancel out and it does
not show up in (19). Additionally, bJ(ê) can be chosen
carefully to compensate for the f2(ê) and Var[J(e, ê)] terms.
Therefore, by tuning the parameters of this payment function,
we can set ê = e as a local maximum for the sensor’s utility.
We do so by matching terms based on the first and second
derivatives to recover sufficient conditions for optimality.
However, noting our reliance on differentiation, we are only
able to guarantee local optimality.
We first show that ê = e is a local optimal point for the
term p?(e, ê) with respect to ê.
Lemma 1. Fix an effort level e. We have that ê = e is always
a local maximum for ê 7→ p?(e, ê).
Proof. At ê = e, the term σ2(e)−σ2(ê) = 0. Thus, the first
derivative is 0, and all but one term in the second partial
derivative of p?(e, ê) disappears. Noting that σ2 is convex,
we have:
∂2p?
∂ê2
∣∣∣∣
ê=e
= −2bJ(ê)
(
dσ2(ê)
dê
)2
< 0
Thus ê = e is a local maximum.
Now we consider the pvar term in (19).
First, note that Var[J(e, ê)] can be written as:
Var[J(e, ê)]
= 2
N∑
k=0
tr(Q¯kE[x¯kx¯Tk ]Q¯kE[x¯kx¯Tk ])
+
N∑
k=0
N∑
j 6=k
Cov
(
x¯Tk Q¯kx¯k, x¯
T
j Q¯kx¯j
)
Note that this is the variance of a quadratic cost, so it contains
fourth-order terms of the Gaussian variables. This keeps us
from the simpler analysis that applies to first and second
moments.
Additionally, Var[J(e, ê)] is a function of e and ê that
is twice-differentiable. Because we are considering truthful
reporting (i.e. ê = e should be optimal), we only care
about the local properties around ê = e. Var[J(e, ê)] and
its derivatives can be calculated ex-ante at point ê = e.
Therefore, with knowledge of Var[J(e, ê)], we can force
ê = e to be a local maximum by carefully choosing bJ(ê).
Theorem 1. Fix an effort level e. If the following conditions
holds at ê = e, then ê = e is the local maximum for E[p].
1) d
2bJ (ê)
dê2
∣∣∣
ê=e
is sufficiently large.
2) The following equality holds at ê = e:
dbJ(ê)
deˆ
Var[J(e, ê)]f2
−2(ê)
− 2bJ(ê)Var[J(e, ê)]f2−3(ê)df2(ê)
dê
+ bJ(ê)
∂Var[J(e, ê)]
∂ê
f2
−2(ê) = 0
(21)
Proof. We have shown that ê = e is a local maximum
for p?(e, ê) in Lemma 1. Differentiating (19), ê = e is a
local maximum for E [p(J(e, ê), J?(ê))] if it is also a local
maximum for pvar.
∂2pvar
∂ê2
= −d
2bJ(ê)
deˆ2
Var[J(e, ê)]f2
−2(ê) + other terms
Therefore, d
2p
deˆ2s
is negative if d
2bJ (ê)
deˆ2s
is sufficiently large at
ê = e. The Equation (21) is actually the first-order optimality
condition: dpdeˆs = 0.
Therefore, by choosing the parameters of p appropriately,
payment functions of the form in Equation (18) can in-
centivize truthful reporting on the part of strategic sensors.
When the strategic sensor truthful reports, the LQG controller
described in Section IV is optimal, in the sense that it
minimizes the expected cost, given the noise covariances.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the effort-averse strategic be-
havior of a single type of strategic sensors on the expected
quadratic cost of a linear system with Gaussian noise. We
studied how the expected cost E[J ] varies with both the true
effort e, which determines the measurement noise, and the
reported effort ê, which influences the gains of the observer
and controller. Surprisingly, we can decompose E[J ] into
terms that depend soley on e and ê. This allows us to learn
how the expected cost varies with both of these parameters,
and, additionally, allows us to define payment contracts that
can incentivize truthful reporting in expectation. We show
that payment contracts typically used in static settings fail
to incentivize truthful reporting in general, and then modify
the mechanism using values that can be calculated a priori,
which incorporate the closed-loop effect of reported data into
the payment itself.
We view this work as the first step into understanding
how to incentivize strategic data sources in dynamic settings.
In particular, we show that the mechanisms designed in
the static setting will often not work in dynamical settings
due to the closed-loop behavior of the system. Additionally,
many parameters from the closed-loop system likely must be
incorporated in order to achieve desirable properties, such as
truthful reporting. In future work, we hope to consider how
the system operator behaves when the payments are costly:
how does the system operator trade-off the cost of issuing
payments with the system’s operational costs?
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